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This article addresses the different treatment of lawyers and
accountants in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The article begins with
an analysis of the SEC's authority to establish and regulate accounting
standards. The article analyzes the SEC's historic oversight of auditors
and its delegation of some of this oversight function to the accounting
profession. It then provides a detailed analysis of the accounting
profession's history of regulation under this delegation. This section
also analyzes the role of SEC Rule 102(e) prior to the adoption of
Sarbanes Oxley. The article then contrasts the treatment of lawyers and
accountants in Sarbanes-Oxley and describes the effect of Sarbanes
Oxley on multidisciplinary practices between lawyers and accountants.
The article concludes that Congress' relatively light treatment of
lawyers, in comparison to its micromanagement of the accounting
profession, is attributable to the lack of effective self-regulation by the
accounting profession in comparison to the many successful self-
monitoring and discipline systems established by and within the legal
profession. It also issues a cautionary note to the legal profession,
suggesting that the reforms contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation
provide guidance to the legal profession to ensure that it remains a
robust profession, able to protect and champion clients' rights.
In the wake of increasing revelations of corporate scandals, most
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notably the pervasive corruption and recklessness associated with the
collapse of Enron, Congress acted with unusual dispatch in enacting
corrective, prophylactic legislation to rein in what may be perceived as
the demise of corporate responsibility. The end result was the passage of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley" or the 
"Act").'
Among the most significant provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are the
extensive disciplinary and practice rules for the accounting profession,
deemed necessary due to the abrogation of disciplinary responsibility by
both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which was created
in part to provide such oversight, and the accounting profession itself. In
contrast, Sarbanes-Oxley imposes only minimal obligations upon
attorneys. The law, however, should serve as a graphic reminder to the
legal profession that it must be proactive in enforcing its own well-
established ethical and disciplinary scheme so that it too is not forced to
relinquish independent professional oversight.
Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted in July 2002, following extended and
highly publicized Congressional hearings. Federal lawmakers concluded
the self-regulatory efforts of the accounting profession to monitor
accountant behavior in the corporate setting, as well as the SEC's system
of accounting oversight, were ineffective and in need of a major overhaul
necessitating government intervention. 2  The centerpiece of Sarbanes-
Oxley, therefore, became a regulatory scheme directed at the accounting
profession, which previously had been almost free from government
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), enacted July 30, 2002. See also President's
Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. DOC.
1283-1285 (Aug. 2, 2002) ("[T]oday I sign the most-far reaching reforms of American
business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. This law sends very
clear messages that all concerned must heed. This law says to every dishonest corporate
leader: 'You will be exposed and punished. The era of low standards and false profits is
over. No boardroom in America is above or beyond the law.' ... This law says to
corporate accountants: 'The high standards of your profession will be enforced without
exception. The auditors will be audited. The accountants will be held to account."').
2. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S6526 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (comments of Sen.
Sarbanes) ("it is very clear, as this issue has unfolded, that [Congress] needs to make
structural changes. We need to change the system so that the so-called gatekeepers are
doing the job they are supposed to be doing. That has not been happening."); 148 CONG.
REC. S7351 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (comments of Sen. Sarbanes to Senate Committee)
(the "legislation establishes a carefully constructed statutory framework to deal with the
numerous conflicts of interest that in recent years have undermined the integrity of our
capital markets and betrayed the trust of millions of investors . . . [and] establishes a
strong independent accounting oversight board, thereby bringing to an end the system of
self-regulation in the accounting profession which, regrettably, has not only failed to
protect investors, as we have seen in recent months, but which has in effect abused the
confidence in the markets, whose integrity investors have taken almost as an article of
faith").
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regulation. The Act essentially created a new "watchdog" for
accountants, the Public Company Accountant Oversight Board
(hereinafter the "Board"),3 and forbade accounting firms from offering
consulting and other professional services, most notably legal advice, to
public audit clients, derailing recent stepped-up efforts by the accounting
profession to expand the role they played with clients.4 Congress also
increased regulation of the financial officers of public companies, created
corporate governance standards, instituted a Code of Ethics for financial
officers, and increased certification requirements for executive officers
and boards of directors through Sarbanes-Oxley.5
By contrast, Congress imposed comparatively minimal regulations
on attorneys practicing before the SEC.6 In part, this may be attributed to
the unique role played by attorneys charged with zealous advocacy on
behalf of their clients, versus that played by accountants required to act
as independent auditors who stand apart from their clients and scrutinize
a corporation's financial records. The disparate nature of Sarbanes-
Oxley's restrictions on the two professions also may be explained by the
legal field's history of established, strong self-governing structures, such
as state ethics boards and grievance committees operating through the
courts.
The history of the SEC's role in overseeing auditors for public
companies and prior self-regulation within the accounting profession
provides insight as to the reasons Sarbanes-Oxley reforms are directed
mainly at the accounting profession. Moreover, the reforms contained in
the Act provide guidance to the legal profession to ensure that it remains
a robust profession that continues to be able to protect and champion
clients' rights.
I. The Securities and Exchange Commission as Regulator
A. SEC Authority to Establish and Regulate Accounting Standards and
its Delegation to the Accounting Profession
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established in
1934 in response to the severe financial crises of the 1920s, most notably
the stock market crash of October 1929. Prior to the SEC's
establishment, the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") had
established a system requiring a public corporation to register its stock
sales and distributions and to regulate its financial disclosures to the
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) at §§ 101-109.
4. Id. at §§ 201-209.
5. Id. at §§ 301-308, 401-409.
6. Id. at § 307.
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public.7 In the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"),
Congress authorized the SEC to regulate this corporate activity, as well
as the activity of financial exchanges and brokers.8
During debate on the passage of the Securities Act of 1933, several
lawmakers proposed that a body of government auditors be created to
audit public companies. 9 This proposal was rejected after members of
the accounting profession urged Congress to rely instead on the private
sector of accountants to regulate themselves.10 The rationale for this
decision was that accountants had the expertise and skills to conduct
such audits and were better equipped to detect accounting problems at an
earlier stage.1 In lieu of establishing government auditors, and as an
additional means of monitoring the profession, Congress required that all
financial statements filed by a public company with the SEC be certified
by public or independent accountants, allowing the SEC to prescribe the
format in which such information should be put forward.' 2 The SEC also
was empowered to define "accounting, technical and trade terms" and to
dictate the required methods to be used in preparation of accounts,
earning statements, balance sheets and regulations concerning the
preservation of records and books.' 3 The SEC adopted Regulation S-X
and other similar regulations to implement these provisions.14
The SEC, however, promptly delegated its oversight responsibilities
to the accounting profession itself,15 allowing the Committee on
Accounting Procedure16 to establish financial accounting and reporting
7. 15 U.S.C. 77a, et. seq.
8. 15 U.S.C. 78a, et. seq.
9. Roberta S. Karmel, Securities Regulation-Enron and the Accounting
Profession, 2/21/2002 N.Y.L.J. 3, (col. 1) (referring to Hearings on S. 875 Before the
Senate Comm. On Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (remarks of Sen.
Adams), 57-59 (remarks of Sen. Reynolds) (1933)).
10. Id.
11. Id. (referring to SEC Release No. 150, 1973 WL 149263 (October 20, 1973));
see also Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard
Setter, Commission Release Nos. 33-8221; 34-47743; IC-26028; FR-70 (available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/33-8 2 2 1.htm) (stating that Commission concluded that
expertise and resources of private sector in the process of setting accounting standards
would benefit investors).
12. Id. (referring to 15 U.S.C. 77aa (25)-(27) (schedule of information required in
registration statement)).
13. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. 77s(a) and 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)).
14. Id. (referring to 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01 (independence and good standing
requirements); id. at 210.2-02 (requirements concerning audit representations and
opinions); id. at 210.4 (general rules of form, content, and method of presentation of
financial statements); id. at 256 (prescribing an accounting system to be used by certain
types of companies); id. at 257 (regulations concerning the preservation of books and
records)).
15. Id.
16. The Committee on Accounting Procedure is a committee of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).
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standards from 1938-1959. Pursuant to its mandate and during that
timeframe, the AICPA issued fifty-one Accounting Research Bulletins
that formed the basis of what came to be known as the generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP).I7 This committee was followed
by the establishment of the Accounting Principles Board of the AICPA
from 1959-1973, which issued thirty-one new principles during its
tenure. 
18
By the early 1970s, the AICPA recognized that increasing
complexities of the business world required the complete and full-time
focus of an association to develop proper accounting standards.
Accordingly, the task was moved from an AICPA committee to the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), a private-sector
organization financed by the Financial Accounting Foundation.' 9 The
FASB's mission is "to establish and improve standards of financial
accounting and reporting for the guidance and education of the public,
including issuers, auditors and users of financial information. ''20  The
SEC recognized the accounting standards promulgated by the FASB and
stated that the "principles, standards and practices promulgated by the
FASB... will be considered by the Commission as having substantial
authoritative support, and those contrary to such FASB promulgations
will be considered to have no such support.
' 21
1. Oversight of Auditors
In addition to delegating the establishment of accounting standards,
the SEC also abrogated its authority to oversee the activities of auditors,
leaving the task of establishing auditing standards to the accounting
22profession. As a result, the accounting profession has relied on internal
checks within the profession to serve as its ethical barometer and issue
discipline where appropriate. Until Sarbanes-Oxley, the profession
itself, through the AICPA and its affiliated entities, had determined the
proper role of an accountant in serving as auditor to a publicly held
17. The Enron Crisis: The AICPA, The Profession & The Public Interest (last
modified Feb. 20, 2002), available at http://www.aicpa.org/info/regulation02.htm
(providing a "brief history of self-regulation).
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also Karmel, supra note 10; Facts about FASB (2003-2004)
http://www.fasb.org/facts/index.shtm. The Financial Accounting Foundation is a group
representing corporate interests from 1973 to the present.
20. Facts about FASB (2003-2004) http://www.fasb.org/facts/index.shtml (setting
forth mission of the FASB).
21. See Karmel, supra note 10 (referring to SEC Release No. 150, 1973 WL 149263
(October 20, 1973)).
22. The Enron Crisis, supra note 18.
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company.23 For example, the AICPA is currently the main self-
regulating organization for accountants, responsible for setting
professional rules and ethical guidelines, issuing disciplinary decisions,
and posting the same on their website.24 Curiously, the AICPA assumes
this responsibility despite the fact that a large portion of its funding
comes from the very individuals and firms it seeks to regulate. The
AICPA also does not have the authority to suspend licenses or stop
unethical accountants from practicing. Rather, the AICPA only can
impose limited sanctions upon its members, related primarily to
membership in the organization.25 Although the AICPA may refer the
disciplinary matter to the state societies regulating the accounting
profession,26 such referrals are extremely rare and thus do little to deter.27
It is unfortunate that state regulation systems are not included in the
review of accountant behavior more often because as state regulatory
agencies are the entities that issue practice licenses to accountants, and,
therefore, may also act to suspend those licenses or impose penalties for
disciplinary violations by accountants.28 In New York, for instance, the
Office of the Professions, part of the New York State Education
Department, is tasked with regulating accountants. 29  The Board of
Regents of the New York State Education Department has issued Rules
of Professional Conduct that apply to public accountants, 30 and the
Office of Professional Discipline investigates and prosecutes complaints
of professional misconduct. 31 The Board of Regents handles the most
serious of these cases and may impose mandatory continuing education,
fines or suspensions, or revoke one's license.32 These sanctions certainly
23. Id.
24. See http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/cpaltr/disciplil.htm. The AICPA recently has
begun to publish ethics decisions in the Wall Street Journal, a publication read by leaders
of the corporate world, as a means of making public their decisions about unethical
behavior on the part of accountants. See Lisa A. Snyder, Streamlining Ethics
Enforcement: It's Time the Profession Sped Up the Ethics Enforcement Process and Let
the Public See How it Works, 8/1/03 J. Acct. 51, 2003 WL 122003659.
25. See http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/ethics/defin-sanction.asp (AICPA
Definitions of Ethics Sanctions/Disposition, including the issuance of letters requiring
corrective action, such as directing a member to complete CPE courses, admonishment
by the AICPA Joint Trial Board or expulsion or suspension of membership within
AICPA).
26. See http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/ethics/defin-sanction.asp.
27. Of the 253 cases completed from January 1 to December 1, 2002, only two were
referred to state societies. See http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/ ethics/staterpt.htm
(Annual Report of AICPA Disciplinary Action).
28. See http://www.aicpa.org/about/faq012.htm.
29. See http://www.op.nysed.gov.
30. Rules of Board of Regents, 29.10, Special Provisions for the Profession of Public
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have more teeth than those imposed by the self-regulating organization
of the profession.
In 1989, the AICPA enacted by-laws mandating that members who
audited publicly held companies must work for a firm belonging to the
AICPA SEC Practice Section,33 and that such firms must undergo a "peer
review" every three years by another accounting firm of similar size, as a
means to ensure that auditors and accountants were complying with
generally accepted auditing practices and standards.34 Results of these
reviews are made available to the public on the AICPA website.35
Originally, these peer reviews and quality control methods were overseen
by the Public Oversight Board of the AICPA, a group considered to be
"quasi-independent" although it was actually financed by the AICPA and
its membership.36 Recent events establish that such "peer reviews" were
unsuccessful in assuring "quality control" in a number of the larger
accounting firms.37
The major ethical focus by accounting self-regulating organizations
prior to Sarbanes-Oxley was auditing standards and the regulation of
auditing practices, with the primary focus being placed upon the issue of
"independence." As noted earlier, the federal securities laws require that
financial information filed with the SEC be certified and audited by an
"independent" public accountant. 38  Although the definition of
"independence" has been a complicated issue for the accounting
profession, the term generally refers to those auditing activities that do
not create a potential conflict of interest or otherwise compromise an
accountant's objectivity.39
A sampling of those activities deemed by the AICPA to
compromise an accountant's independence include: acquiring financial
interest in the client, acting as trustee of trust or executor or administrator
of any estate for client, grandfathered employment relationships,
considering employment with client, having custody of client's assets, or
serving as a client's stock transfer or escrow agent, registrar. These
activities indicate that the provision of multiple services to a client may
33. See http://www.aicpa.org/centerprp/full-reg.htm.
34. See http://www.aicpa.org/centerprp/peer-review.htm.
35. See http://www.aicpa.org (peer review reports).
36. See http://www.aicpa.org./info/regulation02/htm. That Board was dissolved in
March of 2002, however, in anticipation of SEC mandated changes in the self-regulation
of the accounting profession.
37. See id.
38. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, Securities
Act Release No. 7870, (June 30, 2000).
39. See http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/etl01.htm (setting forth Rule 101-
Independence). The AICPA website contains twenty-five pages interpreting the meaning
of independence as set forth in its Rule 101, detailing activities that are considered to
impair independence.
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compromise an accountant's independence or create a conflict of interest.
Indeed, the matter of providing multiple services to clients has presented
something of a dilemma for the accounting profession, especially in the
context of auditors serving as consultants for the very firms they audit.
Despite what appears to be an obvious conflict of interest in such an
event, the AICPA specifically has stated that even if one of its members
provides extensive advisory services for a client, including attendance at
board meetings, analyzing financial statements, offering advice on
potential expansion plans and serving in a banking relationship, the
member would not be considered compromised for auditing purposes
because such a role was "advisory. 4 ° In hindsight, accountants who
looked to the AICPA for guidance on this issue of independence and
conflicts of interest were led astray, as these "advisory" behaviors are
thought to have been a substantial cause of the recent downfall of major
corporations and accounting firms.
Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, although the SEC was empowered to
define "independence" insofar as independence related to the filing and
certification of financial statements, the SEC was never able to prevent
these conflicts because Congress never gave the SEC authority to
regulate auditing standards. 4' The SEC did issue new auditor
independence rules in 2000,42 but contentious arguments between the Big
Five accounting firms 4 3 and the SEC ultimately prevented the SEC from
prohibiting accounting firms from providing consulting services to audit
clients.
Despite the AICPA's efforts to regulate accountants and maintain
independence within the profession, these self-regulatory attempts failed
miserably. Indeed, in the fiscal year 2002, a mere 253 disciplinary cases
were completed under the auspices of the AICPA, representing all
disciplinary action taken by the organization within the fifty states;
certainly not a measure of the unethical behavior occurring at that time.
Reliance on peer review and reports of accounting misbehavior similarly
were ineffective, particularly within the context of larger accounting
firms where unethical (and illegal) behaviors were not the result of
improper behavior by an individual CPA, but the combined efforts of
40. See Ethics Rulings on Independence, Integrity and Objectivity, ET Section 191,
No. 8, available at http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/etl91 .htm.
41. See 15 U.S.C. 77aa (25-26); 15 U.S.C. 78q et. seq., 17 C.F.R. Part 210.3-01.
42. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,
Securities Act Release No. 7919 (Nov. 21, 2000).
43. Although the recent demise of Arthur Anderson may have changed this grouping
to the "Big Four," the Big Five Accounting Firms in 2000 were: 1) Deloitte & Touche;
2) KPMG; 3) Arthur Anderson; 4) Price Waterhouse Cooperative; and 5) Ernst & Young.
See Geanne Rosenberg, Big Four Auditors' Legal Services Hit by Sarbanes-Oxley, NEW
YORK L.J., available at www.nylawyer.com/news/0
4 /01/ 010504b.html.
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numerous actors. A focus on the individual CPA was no longer good
enough. As one commentator, a long time professor of accounting, said
when expressing his "disappointment" in the accounting profession in
comments made to the SEC in 2000,
the accounting profession and the AICPA appear to have regressed
from having a primary commitment to the public interest and
professionalism to having a major concern for the private interest and
the business of public accounting. The AICPA's many attempts at
self-regulation appear to have failed, and the profession appears
increasingly to deny that anything seriously is wrong... (as
evidenced by the fact that) the AICPA and three of the five major
accounting firms are vigorously attempting to prevent the adoption of
this proposed revision of rules on auditor independence.
44
B. Rule 102(e)-The SEC Tool of Enforcement
Prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, the primary tool available
to the SEC to oversee behavior by those professionals who practiced
before it was Rule 102(e). 45 Theoretically, Rule 102(e) could be used to
sanction any professional practicing before the SEC, but since the 1970s,
SEC Rule 102(e) proceedings have been instituted principally against
CPAs.46 The rule allows sanction when, after opportunity for notice and
hearing, a finding is made that a professional: (i) does not possess the
requisite qualifications to represent others; (ii) is lacking in character or
integrity or has engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct;
or (iii) willfully violated, or aided or abetted the violation of Federal
Securities laws or the rules or regulations pertaining to those laws.47
The use of Rule 102(e) has proven controversial, especially as
applied to accountants. 48 The term "improper professional conduct" was
not clearly defined in the legislation and the lack of clarity led to
problems for the SEC with respect to a matter involving a proceeding
against two auditors.49 In Checkosky v. SEC, two auditors appealed the
SEC's judgment that they had engaged in improper professional conduct
44. Commentary of Harvey Hendrickson on proposed SEC rule No. S7-1300,
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71300/hendric2.htm.
45. 17 C.F.R. Part 201.102(e).
46. Leo Orenstein and Marc Dorfman, A Rule Gone Bad - SEC No Longer Needs to
Rely on Rule 102(e), But Can't Seem to Let Go, LEGAL TIMES, Vol. 23, No. 46
(November 20, 2000).
47. 17 C.F.R. Part 201.102(e)(1)(i-iii).
48. See Orenstein, supra note 47.
49. Checkosky v. SEC, 139 F. 3d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (D.C. Cir. found SEC had
achieved "impressive feats of ambiguity" in defining "improper professional conduct,"
criticizing Agency for not articulating a "clearly delineated standard").
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under Rule 102(e).5° After calling upon the SEC to explain the
applicable standard for its review, the D.C. Circuit Court found that the
SEC was incapable of doing so and had no clear and coherent definition
of the prohibited conduct. 51 The Court, therefore, remanded the case to
the SEC to dismiss.52
Following the remand, the SEC amended Rule 102(e), with the
intent of providing a clear articulation of its standard. This new
definition of "improper professional conduct" applied only to
accountants and required intentional or knowing conduct, which included
reckless conduct and two types of negligent conduct described as "highly
unreasonable conduct," resulting in the violation of professional
standards.53  Some find even this new standard "convoluted and
incomprehensible. 54 The SEC's lack of clarity on this issue exemplifies
their failure to monitor adequately the accounting profession's ethical
behavior.
C. Sarbanes-Oxley's Widespread Effect on the Accounting Profession
Following the disasters in 2002 involving major corporations such
as Enron, it became apparent that neither the AICPA self-regulation nor
SEC oversight were effective in regulating the accounting profession and
thus the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted. As previously noted, the
Act's central means of reforming the practices of the accounting industry
is the creation of a new "watchdog," the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (the "Board"), which co-exists with current self-
regulating organizations. 55 The Board regulates accountant behavior,
which removes the significant level of autonomy accountants enjoyed
pre-Enron. The Board also promulgates rules and regulations, governs
accountant conduct, carries out investigations, and institutes disciplinary
and enforcement actions.56 Public accounting firms are required to
register with the Board and may not prepare audit reports for registered
issuers without being registered with the Board.57
The Board is funded primarily by publicly traded companies and
consists of five members who are appointed by the SEC after
consultation with the chair of the Federal Reserve Board and the
50. Id. at 222.
51. Id. at 225.
52. Id. at 227.
53. 17 C.F.R. Part 201.102(e)(iv)(A)(1).
54. See Orenstein, supra note 47 (citing SEC Commissioner Norman Johnson).
55. Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.) at § 101(a).
56. Id. at § 101(c).
57. Id. at § 102(a).
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Secretary of the Treasury.58 Of these five members, only two may be
CPAs and, if the chairperson is a CPA, s/he must have been absent from
practicing for five or more years. 59 The Board also was charged with
creating auditing standards, quality control standards, and ethics
standards to be used by registered public accounting firms. 60 The Board
is required to conduct a continuing program of inspections to monitor
compliance of each registered public accounting firm and also must
establish rules and procedures for the investigation and disciplining of
registered public accounting firms. 61 Although the SEC has oversight
and enforcement powers over the Board, the Board itself has the power
to sanction and audit firms, and discipline registered public accounting
firms and associated persons by revoking registrations and impacting
their ability to audit public companies.62
Through Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC also adopted new rules that
expand the requirements of auditor independence, including a mandatory
"cooling off' period of one year after an accountant terminates an
employment relationship.63 Section 201(a) also provides that it is
unlawful for a registered public accounting firm to serve as auditor of a
company while contemporaneously providing certain non-auditing
services. These services include: bookkeeping or other services dealing
with financial statements and accounting records; valuation services;
actuarial services; and legal services.64 These provisions apply to foreign
accounting firms of both U.S. based reporting companies operating
overseas and non-U.S. companies.65
The provisions enacted by Sarbanes-Oxley are extensive and
detailed. For instance, the rules spell out prohibited activity for auditors
with respect to certain non-audit services, require pre-approval for audit
and permitted non-audit services, mandate rotation of audit partners such
that no audit partner can serve more than five years and must then be
58. Id. at § 101(e).
59. Id. at § 101(e)(2).
60. Id. at § 103(a)(1).
61. Id. at § 104.
62. Id. at § 105.
63. Id. at § 106.
64. See R. Max Crane and Jeffrey Fessler, Just When You Thought it Was Safe to Go
Back Into the Water: More SEC Rules and Regulations for Counsel to Implement-
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002-Part II, Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Vol. 11, No. 5
(May 2003) (noting that "[t]he standards for auditor independence are significant in that
one of the major reasons for enacting Sarbanes-Oxley, in addition to the desire to have
more oversight by the Board and particularly its independent members, was the concern
that the company/auditor relationship was too cozy and convenient for there to be
genuine auditor objectivity.").
65. Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.) at § 106 (noting applicability to foreign accounting firms operating in US).
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subject to a five-year waiting period.66 All told, a total of eighteen
sections of the Act are directed at the accounting profession, which is a
direct indictment of the inability of the accounting profession to self-
regulate.
D. Attorneys Before and After Sarbanes-Oxley
Only one section of Sarbanes-Oxley, Section 307, entitled Rules of
Professional Responsibility for Attorneys, is directed at attorneys. This
section applies to attorneys who appear and practice before the SEC and
creates minimum standards of professional conduct for such attorneys.
One important component of the rules enacted by the SEC in compliance
with Section 30767 is a non-revolutionary definition of who the "client" is
when attorneys represent companies before the SEC. The "client" is the
company as an organization, not the company officers, directors, or
employees.68 If they were not before, attorneys now clearly are on notice
that ethical obligations are owed to the company as an organization even
if advising individual employees or officers.69
Consistent with its definition of the corporate client, the rules
promulgated by the SEC further establish an obligation for attorneys to
report material violations of federal and state securities laws and
breaches of fiduciary duty "up the ladder" to chief legal counsel or the
chief executive officer.7 ° If the attorney does not receive an appropriate
response, the attorney is obligated to take the matter to the audit
committee or the full board of directors.7' Alternatively, an attorney
practicing before the SEC in representing a company may report
evidence of material violations to the company's qualified legal
compliance committee if a company has established such a committee.72
By making this report to the committee, an attorney has satisfied the
reporting requirements and is not asked to determine if the response is
adequate.73
After the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC voted to extend the
66. Id. at §§ 202-203.
67. 17 C.F.R. Part 205.1, et. seq.
68. 17 C.F.R. Part 205.3(a).
69. This obligation is also reflected in the Model Rule of Professional Conduct
regarding the client-lawyer relationship, entitled "Organization as Client." MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.13 (1983).
70. 17 C.F.R. Part 205.3(b)(3).
71. 17 C.F.R. Part 205.3(b)(3).
72. 17 C.F.R. Part 205.3(c).
73. Id. Attorneys are excused from these reporting requirements altogether when
they have been retained or directed by the company's chief legal officer or when the
attorney is retained by the qualified legal compliance committee itself to investigate
evidence or undertake an investigation on behalf of the company or applicable officer,
director or agent. 17 C.F.R. Part 205.3(b)(7).
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comment period for a proposal originally included in the Act known as
the "noisy withdrawal" provision. 74  This provision would require
attorneys to notify the SEC of their withdrawal from representation of a
company for "professional considerations." This withdrawal would be
based on the attorney's belief that the company has failed to respond
appropriately and is breaking the law, even after reports of such illegality
have been submitted pursuant to the Act.75 The SEC also is considering
an alternative provision to the "noisy withdrawal" proposal, which would
require the company itself to notify the SEC of the attorney's
withdrawal, when such withdrawal results from the company's failure to
adequately respond to the attorney's initial reports of wrongdoing.76 To
date, neither of these proposals have been enacted.
In contrast to the virtual micromanagement of accountants outlined
in Sarbanes-Oxley, attorneys are neither heavily targeted nor regulated
by the Act because very little government regulation of the profession
exists. This may reflect a recognition that, contrary to some public
perception, lawyers have succeeded in regulating themselves and have
made a successful commitment to establish ethical standards for the
profession and to create mechanisms to enforce those standards.
Attorneys long have recognized the need for controls over
professional behavior and the profession has exercised strong self-
discipline for quite some time. The first professional standards for the
legal profession were adopted in 1887 in the state of Alabama and were
soon adopted by several other states.77 Later, in 1908, following a three-
year study, the American Bar Association (ABA) promulgated the
Canons of Professional Ethics. 78 These canons were in effect until 1964,
when a special committee of the ABA began work on a new set of ethical
provisions, which were adopted in 1969 and are known as the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (the "Model Code").79 The Model
Code provided, for the first time, mandatory standards of acceptable
74. See SEC Release 2003-13, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-
13.htm.
75. Id. (stating that "the significance and complexity of the issues involved,
including the implications of a reporting our requirement on the relationship between
issuers and their counsel," the Commission would take additional time to seek comment
and thoughtfully consider the provision).
76. See id.; see also Bart Schwartz, Corporate Governance, The Rules Are Different
Now, 10/23/2003 N.Y.L.J. 5 (col. 1) (detailing both "noisy withdrawal" provision and
alternate proposal).
77. See Bernard Ingold, An Overview and Analysis of the New Rules of Professional
Conduct for Army Lawyers, 124 MIL. L. REv. 1 (Spring 1989) (citing Armstrong, A
Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 1063 (1978) (canons were based on work by legal
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ethical behavior that subsequently were adopted in some form by most
states.80 Revisions.of these provisions were ongoing, culminating in the
enactment of the ABA Model Rules in the 1980s,81 as well as the
tailoring and revision of state disciplinary rules of professional
responsibility in the individual states.
82
To date, lawyers practicing in any state are subject to the
disciplinary code and rules of professional responsibility adopted by that
state. These rules are interpreted by State Bar Associations, which are
attorney membership organizations that, among other functions, issue
ethics opinions and help interpret the ethical rules of the given state.
Many states have established such bar associations at the county and the
city level as well. Although these bar associations are not disciplinary
bodies insofar as they have no authority to enact disciplinary
mechanisms, other than negative opinions, or to specify penalties for
violations, great weight is given to the ethical opinions issued by these
bodies and most attorneys are motivated to avoid referral to bar
association disciplinary committees. These decisions are published to
the profession as a whole and great importance is placed upon attorneys
by their own peers to abide by the disciplinary rules and codes of
professional responsibility.83
Despite the fact that attorney peer pressure to abide by the rules is
so pronounced and effective, members of the profession have recognized
that the rules themselves, as administered through the various bar
associations, had very little "teeth" to truly discipline those whose
misconduct seriously violated the state codes of professional
responsibility. Twenty years ago, New York State addressed this issue
and established formal grievance committees through the court system.
Most states also have established similar grievance committees, which
have the power to make recommendations to the state Supreme Courts
which have the power to suspend the license of an attorney and to
otherwise discipline attorneys who have violated the ethical rules of the
80. Id.
81. Id., (noting that the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted in
August, 1983 by the ABA House of Delegates, citing HAZARD, G. AND HODES, W., THE
LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT at
xxxi (1985)).
82. Id.
83. For example, New York State requires attorneys sitting for the bar exam to take
a separate "ethics" exam testing knowledge of the Rules of Professional Responsibility;
this exam, the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam, must be passed to receive
admission to the New York State Bar. See http://www.nybarexam.org/mpre.htm. In
addition, New York requires a minimum level of CLE credits be obtained as part of its
state CLE requirement. See N.Y. Ct. Rules, Part 1500 (setting forth New York's
mandatory CLE requirements) see also http://www.courts.state.ny.us/
attorneys/cle/index.shtml.
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state.84
Often, grievance committees are run through the court system. In
New York, the conduct of attorneys is governed by the Appellate
Divisions of the State Supreme Court and the disciplinary and grievance
committees appointed by that court.85 The grievance committees are
comprised of both attorneys and non-attorneys, working with a court-
appointed, state-financed professional staff.86  Each committee
investigates the complaints it receives against various attorneys.
87
Various levels of sanction are available against attorneys ranging from a
letter of caution not made public to disbarment. In cases of serious
misconduct, possibly resulting in disbarment and/or monetary fines, the
committee refers the matter to the court for formal disciplinary
proceedings.88
Despite the somewhat unsavory portrayal of lawyers and the
proliferation of anti-lawyer jokes, the legal profession has been very
successful in establishing a code of ethics, living by it, and enforcing it.
For instance, the New York State courts' Grievance Committee system
hears and decides a large volume of grievance cases-in a one-year
period from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 200Z, the four Appellate
84. In each state and the District of Columbia, the court of highest appellate
jurisdiction has the inherent and/or constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law.
See, e.g., In re Shannon, 876 P. 2d 548, 570 (Ariz. 1994) (noting that the state judiciary's
authority to regulate the practice of law is universally accepted and dates back to the
thirteenth century); Hunt v. Maricopa County Employees Merit Sys. Comm'n, 619 P. 2d
1036 (Ariz. 1980) (listing cases from numerous states recognizing the authority of the
state supreme courts to regulate the practice of law); In re Attorney Discipline System,
967 P. 2d 49 (Cal. 1998) (noting that in every state the court has the power to admit and
discipline lawyers).
Judicial regulation of the legal profession in the United States has evolved into an
effective, complex, professionally-staffed enterprise. The entity responsible for
investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating allegations of misconduct (violations of the
rules/codes of professional conduct) at the behest of the court varies in each state. In
some states the court has delegated that job to the state bar association. For example, in
California the State Bar of California is considered an arm of the court for this purpose.
In re Attorney Discipline System, 19 Cal. 4th 582 (1998). In other states, the supreme
court has created an agency of the court separate from the state bar association. For
example, the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court
of Illinois was created by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1973 and is empowered to
investigate, prosecute and adjudicate allegations of misconduct by lawyers. 103 Ill.2d,
Rs. 751 through 771.
85. A GUIDE TO ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE IN NEW YORK STATE, prepared
by NYSBA Committee on Professional Discipline, available at
http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Public-Resouces/Attorney-Grievance-P
rocedures.htm; see also http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/attorneygrievance/
complaints-attorney.shtml.
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Divisions of the New York State Court System received 14,044 new
matters and had 5,932 matters pending from the previous year. Of these,
14,300 were disposed of in one year's time. 89 Altogether, 1785 attorneys
were disciplined by letters of caution, letters of admonition or reprimand
and referral to court.90 Of the 691 referred to court for trial, 448 cases
closed, resulting in 84 disbarments, 75 suspensions, 26 resignations and
23 public censures.9' This is significant when contrasted with the
AICPA's national record of 253 decisions in a full year. Lawyers must
continue along this path of strong self-discipline, revising the various
codes as necessary, always keeping in mind the need to be zealous
advocates for their clients. Failure to do so may result in government
interference with the role of self-governance, similar to that seen within
the accounting field.
E. Multi-Disciplinary Practice
Sarbanes-Oxley's limits on multi-disciplinary practice abroad is
another example of how the accounting profession is further limited by
the Act. Indeed, Congress has dealt a fatal blow to multi-disciplinary
practice abroad and, thus, to the marketing of accounting firms as a place
for "one-stop shopping" for their clients, including audits and legal
services. During the late 1990s, America's largest accounting firms, the
Big Five, were hiring lawyers, acquiring law firms overseas, establishing
overseas branches of U.S. companies, and providing legal services to
audit clients.92  By 2001, the Big Five accounting firms together had
more lawyers on staff than the largest five law firms in the world.
93
Anderson Legal, the legal branch of Arthur Andersen Global, led the
pack with 2,880 lawyers on staff, the second largest number of attorneys
in any law firm. Andersen Legal was dissolved during the Enron
meltdown, however, and many of those attorneys moved on to other
accounting firms' global law practices, such as Ernst & Young.
94
In the United States, local bar association rules have prevented
accounting firms from engaging in law practice, as did attorney fee-
89. See New York Bar Association Annual Report of Committee of Professional
Discipline, NYSBA Annual Meeting Jan. 26-31, 2004, Reports by Committee Sections-
Committee on Professional Discipline, available at http://www.nysba.org.
90. See id. at Table 1. The other matters were rejected for failing to state a claim,
referred to other agencies, dismissed or withdrawn. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Big Six Count on Legal Work, Large Accounting Firms are Moving into
Areas that Were Once the Exclusive Domain of Lawyers, 2/9/1998 LEGAL TIMES S44
(detailing US accounting firms' expansion into legal arena).
93. Rosenberg, Geanne, Big Changes in Offing for Big Four, Sarbanes-Oxley
Triggers Restructuring in Global Law Networks, NAT'L. L.J. 8, Col. 4, 12/12/03.
94. Id.
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splitting restrictions. The SEC also prohibited auditors of public
companies from providing legal service to audit clients in the United
States. 95 Nonetheless, the SEC was aware that accounting firms engaged
in overseas expansion were in the business of providing legal services to
their overseas clients. The SEC chose not crack down on this
development prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, however.
96
Section 201(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act addresses auditor
independence and clearly prohibits the provision of legal services by
accounting firms to auditing clients either in the United States or
abroad. 97  The SEC took this provision to heart and enacted a rule
prohibiting the provision of legal services in foreign jurisdictions.98 As a
result, the accounting world's global law networks are either on hold
while awaiting the effects of the new law or, in some cases, these
networks have been disassembled and attorneys have moved elsewhere.99
II. Conclusion
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the rules
subsequently established by the SEC resulted in a wide-spread regulatory
scheme directed at the accounting profession and the executive and
financial officers of public companies. Accounting firms were further
restricted by the Act's prohibition against the multi-disciplinary practices
that had been cultivated by the Big Five accounting firms. These
restrictions were the result of a long-history of poor self-regulation and
discipline within the accounting profession and lack of oversight of
accounting practices by the SEC.
Attorneys, on the other hand, were the subject of only one provision
of Sarbanes-Oxley, which created a reporting obligation for attorneys
practicing before the SEC who become aware of corporate wrongdoing.
This comparatively light treatment of attorneys by Congress was the
result of the many successful self-monitoring and discipline systems
established by and within the legal profession. Those engaging in the
practice of law would do well to maintain and continually update these
systems in order to ensure they are not the next profession facing
government intervention and regulation.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.) at § 201(a) (amending Section 1OA of the Exchange Act to include "legal
services and expert services unrelated to the audit" among the prohibited activities).
98. See Final Rule: Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding
Auditor Independence, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final33-8183.htm.
99. Rosenberg, supra note 93 (quoting Joseph Petito, a partner at
Pricewaterhousecoopers, Saba Ashraf, a tax partner at Alston & Bird and Gerald A.
Kafka, a tax lawyer who left a large firm).
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